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Helping Loose Ends Meet? The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft Law as a Tool of 
Multi-Level Governance 
 
Oana Stefan PhD, Senior Lecturer in Public and European Law, King’s College London.1 
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Abstract  
In the established multi-level governance system of the European Union, the Court of Justice 
was instrumental in framing a supranational constitution. During the recent years, a vast 
variety of soft law and soft methods of governance were put in place, ‘loosely’ binding 
together the different layers of EU governance. While the Union Courts sometimes engage 
with such instruments and methods, they fail to acknowledge important consequences that soft 
law can have on the rights and obligations of individuals. This approach can have a negative 
impact on the justiciability of soft law, creating the premises for a vast body of EU 
instruments to escape judicial control. Furthermore, in the absence of judicial recognition, 
soft law fails to accomplish some of its key objectives, such as fostering legal certainty, 
transparency, and the consistent application of rules in the EU multi-level governance system. 
  
 
1 For comments on earlier drafts, thanks to Patricia Popelier, Werner Vandenbruwaene, the participants to the 
Seminar on the constitutional adulthood of multi-level governance (May 2013), and the anonymous reviewer. 






Governance in the European Union may be represented as a ‘loosely coupled multi-level 
system'2 along three dimensions: the relations between EU – national – subnational levels; the 
relations between the MS or between various sub-national authorities; and the relations 
between executives – parliaments – interest groups/constituencies. These different levels of 
policy making are connected ‘not by binding decisions but by transfers of information, not by 
delegates with clearly defined mandates but by representatives who negotiate on goals and not 
fixed positions’.3 In this construction, ‘new’ modes of governance4 appear instrumental, and 
they are preferred over traditional models of government, ‘where collectively binding 
decisions are taken by elected representatives within parliaments and implemented by 
bureaucrats within public administrations’.5 In the European context, soft law and the Open 
Method of Co-ordination (OMC) are central to new governance, because of their lack of 
 
2 A. Benz, ‘The European Union as a loosely coupled multi-level system’ in H. Enderlein et al. (eds), Handbook 
on multi-level governance (Edward Elgar, 2010), p. 217-218. 
3 A. Benz, ‘Two types of multi-level governance: Intergovernmental relations in German and EU regional 
policy’ 10 Regional and Federal Studies (2000), p.  33. 
4 ‘Types of political steering in which non-hierarchical modes of guidance, such as persuasion and negotiation, 
are employed, and/or public and private actors are engaged in policy formulation’ A. Héritier, 'New Modes of 
Governance in Europe: Policy-Making Without Legislating?' in A. Héritier, Common Goods Reinventing 
European and International Governance, (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2002), p.  185. 
5 O. Treib et al., 'Modes of Governance: Towards a Conceptual Clarification', 14 Journal of European Public 
Policy 1 (2007), p. 3. 
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legally binding force and the emphasis on persuasion and guidance rather than on 
enforcement by a coercive authority.6 
Analysing multi-level governance (MLG) from an instruments perspective is not new.7 
Indeed, MLG instruments have been seen as institutions, representing policies and issues in 
particular ways, and as forms of power, producing effects, sometimes independently of their 
original aims and objectives.8 This article adds a different angle to the study of soft law and 
the Open Method of Co-ordination as tools of MLG, by assessing the role that they play in 
adjudication. Studying the way in which the Courts interact with such instruments might give 
us further insides into the constitutional adulthood of MLG from two points of view. First, the 
constitutional balance of MLG can be ensured to an important extent in a judicial manner.9 Of 
course, this does not mean that MLG can reach constitutional adulthood only through 
adjudication. However, judicial oversight of MLG instruments can help connect the latter to 
core constitutional values, such as legitimacy, participation, transparency, or legal certainty.10 
Second, the CJEU is traditionally considered as the creator of a ‘federal type structure’ in 
Europe.11 Given EU’s departure from a state-centered federalist model, and taking into 
account the recent proliferation of ‘new’ governance mechanisms, the question arises whether 
 
6 Ibid, p. 14. 
7 See Governing the European Union: Policy Instruments in a Multi-Level Polity, special issue of 33 West 
European politics 1 (2010). 
8 H. Kassim and P. Le Galès, ‘Exploring Governance in a Multi-Level Polity: A Policy Instruments Approach’ 
33 West European Politics (2010) 1, p. 4-5. 
9 K. Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ 38 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law (1990), p.205. 
10 See L. Senden, ‘Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ 19 ELJ (2013) 57 p. 
70 – 72. 
11 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ 75 AJIL (1981), p.1. 
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the Court can play the same role now, and contribute to keeping the ‘loosely coupled’ layers 
of governance together. In order for this to happen, Courts should engage with soft law, thus 
enhancing the effectiveness of such instruments. This task is made difficult by the ambiguous 
legal status of soft law, which appears to place automatically such instruments outside the 
courtroom, 12 in a world of ‘governance’ as opposed to the traditional, command-and-control 
world of adjudication. This paper addresses the question whether the CJEU is ready (mature 
enough?) to ensure oversight for soft law and instruments stemming from OMC processes, 
while acknowledging the full spectrum of functions that they can play in a multi-level 
governance context. In so doing, the paper is less concerned with the differences between soft 
law and instruments stemming from the OMC processes. Without generalizing conclusions 
from one sector to the other, the paper strives to unravel existing trends in the case law in 
relation to the vast variety of ‘new governance’ instruments. Furthermore, the analysis is 
limited to the case law of the Luxembourg courts, although the importance of conducting a 
study of national judgment is acknowledged and further research on this topic is encouraged.  
The paper starts by giving a short account of soft law and the OMC in the European Union. It 
continues by streamlining the role that Courts can play in a multi-governance context 
regulated by such instruments, while observing that the Courts can both influence and be 
influenced by soft law and soft methods of governance. The paper identifies several hurdles 
that stand in the way of judicialization of soft law and full judicial endorsement of its 
regulatory functions. It notes that Courts can be influenced by soft law and new governance 
methods, although this influence cannot yet be empirically proven in some sectors. 
 
 
12 J. Klabbers, 'The Undesirability of Soft Law', 67 Nordic Journal of International Law (1998), p. 382. 
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2 Soft methods of coordination 
 
Regulating multi-level types of organizations through ‘soft’ methods is not new. The concept 
of ‘soft law’ originates in public international law and dates back to the early1970s, 13 with the 
1980s bringing a renewed interest in this type of instruments.14 The emergence of the notion 
is closely connected in the literature to the challenges imposed on traditional law-making 
methods by globalization, with the growing importance of non-state actors on the 
international plane15 and with the growth of international institutions.16  
The most quoted definition of soft law is by Snyder, who considers that it consists of ‘rules of 
conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have 
practical effects’17 and also legal effects.18 In the EU context, soft law accounts for more than 
10% of the law,19 and consists of recommendations, opinions (mentioned in Article 288 
 
13 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, 'International Economic Soft Law', 163 Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit 
International (1979), p. 173-177. 
14 K. Wellens, G. Borchardt, ‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ 14 ELRev (1989), p. 268. 
15 U. Mörth, Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: an Interdisciplinary Analysis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
2004), p. 4. 
16 C. Chinkin, 'Normative Development in the International Legal System' in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, (OUP, Oxford 2000), p. 28. 
17 F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’ 
56 MLR (1993), p. 64. 
18 I thank Professor Snyder for suggesting this completion to his initial definition of soft law during the 6 th 
International Workshop for Young Scholars, ‘The Evolution of European Courts: Institutional Change and 
Continuity’, Dublin, 16-17 November 2007. 
19 A. Von Bogdandy et al., ‘Legal Instruments in European Union Law and their Reform: a Systematic Approach 
on an Empirical Basis’ 23 YEL (2004), p. 112. 
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TFEU), but also other instruments such as communications, notices or guidelines. It is 
contrasted with hard law, arising ‘from the treaties, regulations and the Community 
method’,20 and taking the form of Art 288 regulations, directives and decisions.21 Contrary to 
soft law, hard law is endowed with binding legal force, produces general and external effects, 
is adopted by the Community institutions according to specific procedures and has a legal 
basis in the Treaty.22 
The use of soft law in European law dates back to 1962,23 and became, after the 
accomplishment of the internal market, quite frequent in the activity of the European 
Commission. Recently, whole regulatory soft mechanisms were developed at the EU level. 
Starting with the area of economic policy, a ‘model of soft policy coordination’24 was 
institutionalized in sectors such as employment and social policy, inspired by methodologies 
developed at the OECD level.25 The Summit of March 2000 codified this model as the ‘Open 
Method of Co-ordination’ (OMC) and enounced its purpose to facilitate the implementation 
 
20 D. Trubek, et al., '"Soft Law", "Hard Law", and the EU Integration' in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.) Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006), p. 65. 
21 F. Beveridge and S. Nott, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ in P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds.), Lawmaking in the 
European Union (Kluwer, 1998), p. 285; L. Senden & S. Prechal, 'Differentiation in and Through Community 
Soft Law' in B. de Witte et al. (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, (Intersentia, Oxford 2001), 
p. 185 believe that only regulations and directives can be considered hard law. 
22 L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart, Oxford 2004), p. 45. 
23 L. Senden & S. Prechal, in B. de Witte et al. (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, p. 181. 
24 K. Jacobsson, 'Between Deliberation and Discipline: Soft Governance in the EU Employment Policy' in U. 
Mörth (ed.) Soft Law and Governance and Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis, (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2004), p. 82. 
25 L. Tholoniat, ‘The Career of the Open Method of Coordination: Lessons from a 'Soft' EU Instrument’ 33 West 
European Politics (2010), p. 96. 
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of the Lisbon Strategy.26 Soft law instruments are an important part of the Europe 2020 
initiative,27 as the Commission called for institutionalization through guidelines and political 
recommendations.28 
Since 2000, the OMC emerged as a dynamic mode of governance, whose structure and 
objectives have been transforming over time.29 It consists of fixing guidelines for the Union, 
and timetables to achieve goals in certain policy fields. It also entails establishing indicators 
and benchmarks for the MS in order to compare best practices. The OMC presupposes 
translating the European guidelines in national policies, and involves monitoring, evaluation 
and peer review in order to foster mutual learning.30 While soft law comes in an ‘infinite 
variety’, the OMC processes themselves are quite diverse and research shows important 
variation between them depending to the issue regulated.31 
Soft methods of governance are thought to be best suited to deal with the complexity of 
European affairs, their diversity,32 as well as with the bargaining constraints of sovereignty 
and the complicated repartition of competences between the Community and the Member 
 
26 Conclusions of the Presidency,Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000, Part I, pt. 5. 
27 European Council Conclusions 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10. 
28 European Commission Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth COM (2010) 2020, 
para. 5.1. 
29 C. de la Porte and P. Pochet, ‘Why and how (still) study the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)?’ 22 
Journal of European Social Policy (2012), p. 338. 
30 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 24/03/2000, para.37. 
31 Tholoniat, 33 West European Politics (2010), p. 95. 
32 A. Schäfer, 'A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open Method of Co-Ordination to Multilateral 
Surveillance by the IMF and the OECD’, 13 Journal of European Public Policy (2006), p. 84. 
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States (MS).33 Thus, soft law and the OMC have become instrumental in the EU multi-level 
governance, as their flexibility is highly valued in regulating sensitive sectors in which 
agreements are very hard to reach, in tackling issues of regulatory philosophy and broad 
policy, and in addressing situations where swift action is imperative. Soft methods of 
governance are both used in areas of strong competence of the EU, as well as in areas where 
the MS still have considerable power.  
For example, in the competition law area – an area of strong EU competence – soft law has 
been having an increasing role since the implementation of a multi-level system of 
enforcement.34 Following the reform brought by Regulation 1/2003,35 the system of 
competition law enforcement was decentralized and national competition authorities (NCAs) 
together with national courts now share competence to apply competition rules. The inherent 
diversity of this decentralized system is managed through the intermediary of the European 
Competition Network (ECN), a (‘new’ governance) mechanism ensuring coherence and 
effectiveness,36 and also through soft law that ‘went from being purely complementary to the 
core of the business of competition law enforcement’.37 Soft law fulfils an important 
 
33 See on this K. Sisson & P. Margisson, ‘“Soft Regulation” - Travesty of the Real Thing or New Dimension?', 
The Economic and Social Research Centre: “One Europe or Several?” Programme Working Paper no. 32/01 
(2001). 
34 F. Cengiz, ‘multi-level governance in Competition Policy: the European Competition Network’35 ELRev 
(2010), p. 660. 
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
36 I. Maher, ‘Competition Law Modernization: an Evolutionary Tale?’ in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law (OUP, Oxford 2011), p. 737. 
37 I. Maher, ‘Regulation and Modes of Governance in EC Competition Law: What's New in Enforcement?’ 31 
Fordham Int'l LJ (2008), p. 1740. 
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information function, as, by clarifying competition rules, it helps undertakings to discover 
anticompetitive practices and to try to stop them.38   
The OMC as a soft method of governance has been used as a flexible tool that can stretch 
European competences in sensitive areas, where MS show reluctance in relinquishing power 
to Brussels. The OMC has a role to play in fields of limited EU competence, such as labour, 
tax, welfare, education, and migration, but has also helped identifying an EU interest and 
create a role for the European Union in new areas.39 The OMC coordinated action in newish 
areas affected by EU competence such as healthcare, or supplemented existing competence, 
feeding traditional modes of government (in environment).40 It allowed the development of 
regulatory and policy coordination instruments in fields such as finance, in the context of 
scarcity of financial resources at EU level.41 Through the intermediary of the OMC, political 
and ideological constraints were bypassed, while national stakeholders were involved in EU 
matters. By enhancing information exchange,42 the OMC influenced the EU system as a 
whole, and rendered it more transparent. Indeed, through the OMC processes, MS have 
disclosed their priorities and interests, hence enticing contestation of national policies.  
However, one of the most important drawbacks of soft instruments of MLG is their legitimacy 
deficit. Although cheap, fast and flexible, the procedures for the adoption of soft law 
generally tend to circumvent the more costly, but legitimate, decision-making ways. 
Therefore, recourse to soft law might enhance the discretion of Community institutions to the 
 
38 D. Lehmkuhl, ‘On Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy’ 
28 Journal of Public Policy (2008),, p. 147. 
39 Tholoniat, 33 West European Politics (2010), p. 113. 
40 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination’ 12 ELJ (2006), 489-493. 




detriment of the European Parliament and Member State competences.43 Albeit Parliament’s 
involvement in the decision making process increases through the intermediary of soft law 
such as inter-institutional agreements,44 it was noted that its position is not necessarily 
strengthened, because its bargaining power remains the same: the outcome of the final 
negotiations on legislation can depart from the content of the inter-institutional agreement.45 
Even though the preparatory and informative soft law instruments fulfill an important 
function in the pre-legislative stage because it is through these means that the Parliament is 
informed and consulted on future legislation,46 many other soft law instruments are concluded 
without parliamentary involvement. An example is the soft law issued by the European 
Commission in competition law.47  
Furthermore, although the OMC is an instrument conceived to tackle diversity in a MLG 
system, given the relative lack of involvement of national parliaments, it is a method that can 
paradoxically be seen as a centralizing factor.48 Even though recent empirical studies noted 
parliamentary engagement with information from different OMCs, this happens mostly in 
 
43 F. Snyder, ‘Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community’ in S. Martin (ed.), The 
Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël (Kluwer 1994), p. 201-203. 
44 F. Snyder, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations' in G. Winter (ed.) Sources 
and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and  Reform Perspective (Nomos Verlags-Ges, Baden-
Baden 1996), p. 459. 
45 I. Eiselt and P. Slominski, 'Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation, Content, and Legal Value of 
Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU', 12 ELJ 2 (2006), p. 209. 
46 Senden, Soft Law in EC Law, p. 483. 
47 H. Hofmann, ‘Negotiated and Non-Negotiated Administrative Rule-Making: the Example of EC Competition 
Policy’ 43 CMLRev (2006), p. 172. 
48 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination’ 12 ELJ (2006), p. 495-496. 
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fields previously regulated through hard law.49 Stakeholder and expert participation in the 
decision-making process is not always ensured for soft law instruments, ‘since consultative 
procedures are less rigorously adopted and structured in relation to rules whose binding nature 
is uncertain’.50 
Another set of concerns regarding the use of soft law have a functional nature. First the goals 
pursued by soft law and soft methods of governance appear sometimes contradictory. It was 
pointed out that the OMC is used on the one hand in order to feed the policy process with new 
items for the EU agenda, while on the other hand it is used in order to ensure predictability of 
implementation.51 The two objectives are incompatible, given that developing new policies 
means that EU actions are less and less predictable and subject to sudden changes. 
Consequently, the OMC was criticized often as it did not deliver the expected results.  
Second, there is a lot of uncertainty as to the legal effects that soft law can have, absent 
legally binding force. In competition law, NCAs and courts are not bound in any way to apply 
EU soft law, while the Commission has an obligation to take these instruments into account. 
Thus, depending on the level where the decision is taken, soft law may or may not apply to a 
certain case. Furthermore, the high specificity of EU soft law is an element that increases 
divergence between the community of competition law professionals and other legal 
communities.52 As for the OMC, conclusive evidence is yet to be found regarding its precise 
 
49 R. De Ruiter, ‘Full disclosure? The Open Method of Coordination, parliamentary debates and media coverage’ 
14 European Union Politics (2013), p. 111. 
50 R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (Clarendon, 1995), p. 284. 
51 Tholoniat, 33 West European Politics (2010), p. 94. 
52 I. Maher, ‘Functional and Normative Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions: The Case of the European 
Competition Network’ 7 Comparative European Politics (2009), p. 425. 
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impact on learning and change.53 This might have an impact on EU institutional balance, as 
the European Commission might lose credibility as a result of potential failures in the 
implementation of Community policies, and the Council might lose legitimacy and political 
weight.54 The OMC might also undermine the achievements of the Community method as it 
can replace it with sub optimal results.55 
Finally, OMC and soft law challenge core principles of EU law and EU law itself. Supremacy 
and direct effect do not apply to such instruments that lack legally binding force. In hybrid 
situations, such as that of the SGP, hard law would appear according to some commentators 
‘emasculated’, as targets and content of the measure – set through soft law instruments – vary 
at the discretion of the regulated parties themselves, thus rendering the hard law sanctions 
meaningless.56 Some authors consider even that legal scholars should arguably not engage 
with OMC as a new mode of governance unless ‘an OMC objective mirrors an objective in 
another legal instrument, whereby it can influence in the shadow of hierarchy’.57 
3 Role of Courts 
In this context, one may wonder what the role of courts can be in the control and/or 
enforcement of soft law. On the one hand, the question is whether Courts are the appropriate 
institutions to control and enforce soft law. Due to its informative and educative role, soft law 
 
53 de la Porte 22 Journal of European Social Policy (2012), p. 340-344. 
54 V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Why the Open Method of Coordination Is Bad For You: A Letter to the EU’ 13 ELJ (2007), 
p. 320 
55 Ibid., p. 319-320. 
56 Ibid., p. 323. 
57 de la Porte, 22 Journal of European Social Policy (2012), p. 344. 
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appears fashioned for non-judicial forms of dispute settlement.58 The judicial reliance on soft 
law is arguably undesirable, because whenever dealing with such sources, the domestic and 
international courts might tend to transform them into hard law. 59 On the other hand, given 
the proliferation of soft law and soft modes of governance, the European Courts cannot 
simply ignore this reality. This is especially because soft law is often taken seriously by the 
MS authorities and courts,60 and in certain areas the European Commission is bound to apply 
such instruments.61 If EU Courts ignored soft law, they would allow a large amount of 
regulatory material escape judicial control, while losing all potential influence in shaping and 
evaluating the processes leading up to the adoption of such instruments. 62  
Thus, presenting courts and governance (or law and governance for that matter) in contrast 
over simplifies reality. This paper endorses a nuanced view of adjudication, as a process that 
pertains to more than simply applying the rules, and that involves complex assessments of 
interests and values that could ultimately encourage litigants to rely on new forms of 
governance and cooperation.63 In a ‘new governance’ context, the role of the courts needs to 
be redefined: courts are not enforcers of legal rules but rather ‘a source of communicating 
 
58 C. Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ 38 ICLQ (1989), p. 
862-865. 
59 See J. Klabbers, ‘Informal Instruments Before the European Court of Justice’ 31 CMLRev (1994); 'The 
Redundancy of Soft law', 65 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996). 
60 J. Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ 48 
CMLRev (2011), p. 344. 
61 O. Ştefan, ‘Hybridity Before the Court: A Hard Look at Soft Law in the EU Competition and State Aid Case 
Law’ 37 ELRev (2012). 
62 Scott, 48 CMLRev (2011), p. 344-348. 
63 K. Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From ‘Community Method’ to New Modes of 
Governance’ 1 Current Legal Problems (2011), p. 27. 
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ideas and experience… without being specifically prescriptive in relation to any particular 
form’.64 
Thus, the relation between courts and governance should ideally be ‘dynamic and 
reciprocal:’65 courts can shape the necessary link between the realm of governance and that of 
command-and-control, while adjudication and new governance get to influence each other 
reciprocally, ideally creating hybrid forms of interaction.66 However, for this to take place, it 
is important that soft instruments of MLG enter within the Court’s sphere of jurisdiction. 
Such instruments should be challengeable in front of the Courts, in order to ensure full 
judicial control and influence. They should also be recognized as viable swords or shields for 
litigants to use in cases before the Court. This would increase the effectiveness of soft law and 
would ensure that their role as MLG instruments is better accomplished. 
The hurdles concerning the justiciability of soft instruments of MLG are numerous. 
Authorship is sometimes problematic, given that many of these instruments are often the 
result of negotiations between MS or stakeholders, and do not emanate solely from the EU 
institutions. Such co-authored instruments fall outside of Court competence in accordance to 
Article 263 TFEU.67 However, the most important hurdle in the way of justiciability and 
Court recognition of soft law is the miss-match between the actual effects of soft law and the 
readiness of the EU Court to acknowledge them. The range of effects entailed by soft law is 
wide. These can be of practical or of legal nature, but remain rather uncertain from the point 
 
64 J. Scott & S. Sturm, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’, 13 Columbia 
Journal of European Law (2007), p. 572. 
65 Ibid., p. 567. 
66 T. Hervey, ‘Adjudicating in the shadow of informal settlement?: the Court of justice of the European Union, 
“new governance” and social welfare’, 63 Current Legal Problems (2010), p. 114. 
67 Scott, 48 CMLRev (2011), p. 349-350. 
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of view of (traditional) law, absent the legally binding force of the instrument. Enforceability 
of soft law is hence problematic. 68  
Legal effects consist of the capacity of EU legal instruments to change the rights and 
obligations of actors.69 Soft law can thus limit the discretion of the enacting institution, create 
legitimate expectations for individuals, or serve as legal basis for national legislation. In a 
court of law, the effects of soft law include: providing the basis for judicial review; being the 
object of an action for annulment; being used in litigation by the parties to a trial; and serving 
as an aid in the interpretation of hard law provisions.70 The practical effects of soft law 
include the transformations that soft law may generate in the behaviour and practices of the 
MS and the institutions of the Union. Soft law can lead to policy change and it induces subtler 
changes at the level of discourse, understanding and policy principles.71 Hence, ‘formally 
non-binding agreements can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for 
the actors involved’72 by the intervention of certain devices other than the legal force of an 
act, and related to knowledge and meaning making. These devices have a strong sociological 
character and include: common discourse; the symbols of a common project; strengthening 
socialization through repeated meetings; mobilizing the actors and their partnership through 
networks; and iterative processes.73 In the long run, states may integrate, into their national 
 
68 Chinkin, 38 ICLQ (1989), p. 862-865. 
69 T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (7th ed., OUP, Oxford 2010), p.354. 
70 F. Snyder, in G. Winter (ed.) Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform 
Perspective, p. 463. 
71 Jacobsson, in U. Mörth (ed.) Soft Law and Governance and Regulation, p. 89. 
72 K. Jacobsson, 'Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: the Case of EU Employment Policy', 
14 Journal of European Social Policy (2004, p. 359. 
73 Jacobsson, in U. Mörth (ed.) Soft Law and Governance and Regulation, p. 90-98. 
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orders, norms and practices established by way of soft law. 74 Furthermore, soft law can 
helped marginalized groups at the national level to challenge dominant ideologies, and 
achieve results that would not have been attained through hard law.75 
This large variety of effects shows that soft law matters and has important practical and legal 
consequences for national and EU authorities, as well as for individuals. What is more, 
despite the fact that it is deprived of legally binding force, the effects of soft law sometimes 
appear binding, from a legal or even an extra-legal point of view. The problem is that many of 
the political, moral, or even social commitments might have important consequences, 
although they are considered extra-legal by the Courts and are not enforced as such. There are 
only few circumstances when Courts acknowledge the effects of soft law: if soft law 
introduces supplementary obligations not mentioned in hard law provisions; when soft law is 
issued by an institution as a means of structuring its discretion; finally when soft law becomes 
binding on MS as result of negotiations coupled with Treaty obligations.76 Consequently it 
appears that ‘for the issue of justiciability, the distinction between soft and hard law remains a 
valid distinction, while for policy development, implementation and assessment, the 
boundaries between hard and soft are, indeed, more blurred’.77 This paper argues that the 
Courts should be less concerned with ensuring the boundaries between soft and hard law, and 
more willing to acknowledge the practical consequences of soft law, as well as the functions 
that it is meant to achieve in a MLG context.  
 
74 R. Dehousse & J.H.H. Weiler, 'EPC and the Single Act: from Soft Law to Hard Law?' in M. Holland (ed.), The 
Future of European Political Cooperation, (Macmillan, London 1991), p. 132. 
75 Beveridge & Nott, in P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union, p. 293. 
76 Scott, 48 CMLRev (2011), p. 339-343. 
77 de la Porte, 22 Journal of European Social Policy (2012), p. 339. 
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4 The Influence of Courts on Soft law and Soft Governance Methods 
First, courts have the capacity to inculcate within governance structures rule of law values and 
principles through judicial control. Courts could actively influence deliberation processes by 
determining the standards for review of soft law, encouraging the most principled approaches 
towards soft law, while providing ‘an incentive structure for participation, transparency, 
principled decision-making and accountability which in turn shapes, directly and indirectly, 
the political and deliberative process’.78 Judicial review of soft law can be done through the 
direct actions route, as laid down in the seminal Commission v. Council (ERTA) judgment. On 
that occasion, the Court went beyond a literal interpretation of Article 263 TFEU, holding that 
soft law instruments might be reviewable provided they have ‘definite legal effects’.79 Parties 
can also challenge soft law incidentally, in proceedings that have a different main object. 
Indeed, Article 277 TFEU can be used to challenge not only hard law and regulations, but 
also all ‘acts of the institutions which, although they are not in the form of a regulation, 
nevertheless produce similar effects’.80 Thus, the extent to which soft law is justiciable 
depends on the readiness of the Court to give legal weight to the effects such instruments 
might entail in practice. 
Second, by acknowledging soft law and applying it in cases, Courts endorse81 the existing 
regulatory framework that often combines soft and hard law, creating hybrids.82 Thus, courts 
might influence soft law and new governance methods by simply referring to them in their 
 
78 Scott & Sturm, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007), p. 567. 
79Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1970] ECR 263, para. 55. 
80 Case 92/78 Simmenthal v. Commission [1979] ECR 777, para. 40. 
81 Ştefan, 37 ELRev (2012), p. 49. 
82 D. Trubek, L. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and 
Transformation’ 13 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007), p. 539. 
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case law, and by accepting parties’ arguments using soft law as a sword or a shield in 
litigation. By doing so, Courts could enhance the effectiveness of soft law while helping to 
achieve the regulatory goals of such instruments. However, as it will be seen below, while 
emphasizing the difference between legally binding force and legal effects of norms, current 
EU judicial practice fails to acknowledge important consequences that soft law can have on 
the rights and obligations of individuals. This approach can have an important impact on the 
functions that some soft law instruments play at a regulatory level. Thus, even if certain soft 
law is issued by the European Commission in order to enhance the protection of several 
principles of law at the same time, only some of those values can be accommodated. 
4.1 Judicial control of soft law 
Courts have admitted that sometimes soft law interpreting hard law provisions creates new 
obligations and has a binding legal effect. In such situations, soft law is considered ultra vires 
and is annulled by the Courts, as only instruments having a legally binding force can lawfully 
create new obligations for individuals or MS. A classical example is the annulment83 of the 
communication on the application of the financial transparency directive to public 
undertakings in the manufacturing sector84. While a general obligation to supply information 
on financial relations between the State and public undertakings was provided for in the 
directive, the implementing communication created a supplementary obligation, by requiring 
specific data to be sent annually. The Court considered that the communication added to the 
 
83 Case C-325/91 France v. Commission [1993] ECR I-3283, para. 31. 
84 Commission Communication to the Member States -- Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty and 




obligations laid out by the directive, and annulled it for failure to provide the legal basis from 
which it derived its binding force, in accordance to the principle of legal certainty.85 
Thus, the Court does not judge admissibility of an action only by the form of the act, but 
analyses its substance in order to determine whether it produces legal effects or not, and 
whether it can be judicially controlled or not. This should be putting minds at ease, as the 
Court appears to remain the watchdog of EU legislation, be it soft or hard. Furthermore, the 
Court employs a refined analysis and distinguishes between instruments deprived of legally 
binding force and hard law, while not attempting to turn one into the other as critics of soft 
law might argue. There is thus a limit to the obligations that can be lawfully imposed by 
instruments deprived of legally binding force, and the CJEU is ready to verify whether that 
limit was overstepped or not. 
However, this limit is often difficult to grasp, and it depends entirely on the criteria employed 
in order to determine whether soft law introduces new obligations that go beyond what is 
written in hard law provisions. In the case of vague, general hard law norms, it may 
‘frequently be impossible to make a clear determination of where the boundaries of the 
existing obligation begin and end’.86 Even though a soft law instrument might not seem to 
introduce new legal obligations, it might promote a very radical interpretation of an obligation 
provided in a regulation or a directive thus having in practice significant effects on the legal 
situation of individuals or MS. Indeed, one can envisage that in the absence of the soft law 
instrument, the authorities might interpret the specific obligation provided in the hard law 
provision in a more lenient or indeed more stringent way. In the European MLG system, this 
 
85 France v. Commission, paras. 26 and 30. 
86 Scott, 48 CMLRev (2011), p. 342. 
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issue is very important as soft law is applied by national authorities at their absolute 
discretion. 
Thus, in order to ensure enhanced judicial control of soft law, the Courts should  relax its 
admissibility rules, while recognizing the actual impact that soft law may have in practice on 
the legal situation of individuals. The next subsection will focus on examples where the 
Courts failed to acknowledge the full spectrum of effects of soft law instruments. It is argued 
that this failure can have negative consequences on the accomplishment of the regulatory 
functions that soft law should play in the European MLG system. 
4.2 Individual rights protection 
The literature criticizing the use of soft law in court argues that judicial transformation of soft 
into hard law could occur by the positive invocation of soft law, i.e. the use of soft law in 
litigation by individuals or by challenging a soft law instrument via Article 263 TFEU.87 
However, a study of the competition case law shows that even though the Courts frequently 
rely on communications, guidelines or notices of the European Commission, they are careful 
to distinguish between soft and hard law. Judgments such as Dansk Rørindustri88 
acknowledged the binding effects of the antitrust Guidelines on fines;89 in BASF a decision of 
the Commission was considered to be ‘vitiated of illegality’90 because of the misapplication of 
 
87 Snyder, 56 MLR (1993), p. 65; Hofmann, 43 CMLRev (2006), p. 165. 
88 Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205, 208 & 213/02 Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, 
para.211. 
89 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 
65 (5) of the ECSC Treaty, OJ 1998, C 9/3. 
90 Case T-15/02 BASF v Commission [2006] ECR II-497, para. 541. 
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the leniency notice;91 and in Kronofrance92 the Court annulled a decision because the 
Commission failed to correctly apply the adjustment factors for maximum amount of aid 
calculations laid down in the framework on aid for large investment projects.93 A study of 
competition and State aid case law reveals over 600 judgments, orders and opinions where the 
Luxembourg Courts and their Advocates General acknowledged the binding legal effects of 
soft law instruments.94 
All these binding effects were admitted only in limited circumstances, as the Court recognized 
legally binding effects to soft law only with regards to the activity of the European 
Commission. Legally binding effects were not recognized automatically by the CJEU, but 
indirectly, through a mechanism based on the general principles of law.95 The Court admitted 
legally binding effects in those cases because by publishing soft law instruments the 
Commission created a legitimate expectation that it will apply them in cases it investigates. 
Therefore, the Commission limited its own discretion when issuing certain guidelines and 
could not depart from such rules under pain of being found to be in breach of general 
principles of law, such as equal treatment or legal certainty.96  
Acknowledging soft law through the intermediary of general principles of law and human 
rights was criticized in the literature. The content of such principles being wide and 
sometimes ‘disputable’ would make them an inappropriate point of reference to ensure 
 
91 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases OJ 1996, C 207/4. 
92 Case T-27/02 Kronofrance v Commission [2004] ECR II-4177, para.109. 
93 Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, OJ 1998, C 107/7. 
94 Ştefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid, and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Kluwer, 2012), p. 57. 
95 Ştefan, 37 ELRev (2012), p. 62-64. 
96 Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205, 208 & 213/02 Dansk Rørindustri, para.211. 
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justitiablility of soft law.97 This paper argues the contrary. By recognizing the effects that soft 
law can have on the discretion of the European Commission the Courts do not transform soft 
law into hard law, but rather they connect it to the constitutional structure of the European 
Union. That is because all the principles that serve as mediation for acknowledging the self 
binding effect of soft law are constitutional in nature. Legitimate expectations and legal 
certainty are principles common to the constitutional systems of MS,98 recognized on various 
occasions by Courts, and entrenched within the rule of law, a founding value of the EU 
according to Article 2 TEU. Equality is a constitutional value common to the MS, ‘an integral 
part of the rule of law which underlies the political systems and the legal traditions thereof’99 
and a principle that stretches beyond the rule of law and forms an integral part of a democratic 
system.100 So are also other principles cited in the case law in relation to soft law, such as the 
rights of defense,101 fundamental rights,102 and transparency.103 
Thus, without transforming soft law into hard law, the case law of the European Courts serves 
a constitutional function. What is more, the case law is problematic as it operates a too rigid 
 
97 Hatzopoulos, 13 ELJ (2007), p. 336. On the OMC see also Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion 
Europeanization through Policy Coordination (OUP, Oxford, 2010). 
98 P. Craig, 'Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community Law', 55 The Cambridge Law 
Journal (1996), p. 304. 
99 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2006), p. 62. 
100 J. Jowell, 'Is Equality a Constitutional Principle?' 47 Current Legal Problems (1994), p. 18. 
101 Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, p. 370. 
102 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para. 4. 
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distinction between soft and hard law, between legally binding force and legal effects of 
norms. Indeed, the EU Courts fail to acknowledge important consequences that soft law can 
have on the rights and obligations of individuals, as illustrated by case law concerning the 
application of EU soft law within networks of regulatory authorities. 
The recent PTC104 case concerned the 2002 guidelines on market power in electronic 
communications markets.105 The Polish regulator used these guidelines to determine that an 
undertaking, PTC, had significant power in the market of voice call termination services, and 
needed to be imposed regulatory obligations in accordance to EU law.106 PTC argued that the 
guidelines could not be relied on by the regulator, as they had not been published in the Polish 
version of the Official Journal. In preliminary ruling, the Court held that whenever the 
language of a new Member State is an official language of the EU, only obligations laid down 
in EU legislation published in that language can be imposed on individuals in that state. The 
question was whether the guidelines at issue could impose obligations on individuals. Textual 
analysis showed that the guidelines were expressly addressed to the National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs), offering them guidance, and providing for cooperation mechanisms 
between national regulators and the European Commission. Nothing indicated, however, that 
the guidelines laid down obligations for individuals,107 thus, even if unpublished in Polish, 
they could be relied on by the NRA. 
 
104 Case C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (PTC) [2011] ECR I-03853 
105 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ C165/6. 
106 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/33. 
107 Case C-410/09 PTC, paras 31-34. 
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The conclusion reached in PTC points to a potential mis-match between the real impact of 
soft law on the rights and obligations the individuals and the judicial willingness to 
acknowledge and give legal weight to all the effects that soft law might produce. Even though 
they did not expressly lay down legal obligations for individuals, the guidelines on electronic 
communications markets were used by the Polish authority when assessing the regulatory 
obligations that needed to be imposed on the telecommunications operator. Accordingly, the 
guidelines affected the legal situation of individuals, a stance implied by the Court itself in the 
concluding paragraphs of the judgment.108 
Through its informative function, soft law can play a dual role in EU’s MLG system: 
enhancing the cooperation between European and national authorities, and boosting the links 
between institutions and individuals. This dual role was reflected in the goals expressly 
mentioned by the guidelines on market power in electronic communications markets: 
ensuring consistency in the application of electronic communications rules109 and fostering 
foster legal certainty and transparency for businesses.110 PTC shows that only one of these 
two functions can be accommodated under current case law. While the absence of particular 
publication requirements facilitates the consistent application of the guidelines across MS, 
legal certainty and transparency are weakened, as prior translation in the languages of the new 
MS is not deemed necessary for the application of such instruments.  
 
108 Referring to the guidelines, the Court states that there is no ‘principle of EU law under which anything that 
might affect the interests of an EU citizen must be drawn in his language in all circumstances’ (emphasis added). 
Case C-410/09 PTC, para. 37. 
109 Paragraph 11 of the guidelines. 
110 Paragraph 12 of the guidelines. 
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The ‘paradox’111 of soft law is once again confirmed: such instruments, issued in order to 
enhance legal certainty and transparency in the EU administrative activity, are not always 
easily understood by the individuals concerned. The paradox might go even further, given that 
the guidelines can ensure consistency in the application of the new regulatory framework only 
to a limited extent if the NRAs decide to disregard them. Indeed, soft law is not binding on 
national authorities, but it can offer clarification on the interpretation of certain EU law 
provisions and help in the fulfillment of the NRAs’ regulatory tasks.112 
The question is whether the NRAs could be obliged take into consideration European notices 
and guidelines in the name of consistent application of EU law or, indeed, in the name of legal 
certainty and transparency. With regards to the first imperative, ensuring consistent 
application of the law throughout the European Union does not appear to require national 
authorities and courts to take into consideration soft law issued by the Commission. As stated 
in the case law, only a ‘de facto or soft harmonisation’ can be achieved through soft law:113 
common European rules on enforcement can be set only through instruments having legally 
binding force. In Pfleiderer, the Court admitted that soft law can produce effects on the 
practice of national authorities: nonetheless, such effects could not be given legal weight in 
judicial proceedings.114 Since soft law instruments are not binding on the MS,115 they cannot 
be taken into consideration by the CJEU as a common standard. 
 
111 See Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, p. 497; H. Hofmann, ‘Administrative Governance in 
State aid Policy’ in H. Hofmann and A. Türk (eds.), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 
201-202. 
112 Case C-410/09 PTC, para. 31. 
113 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161, 
para. 26. 
114 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161., para. 23. 
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Legal certainty and transparency cannot be invoked as grounds for requiring national 
authorities to comply with soft law issued at the European level either. In Expedia,116 two 
undertakings were fined by the French Competition Authority for having concluded an 
agreement that constituted a restriction of competition by object. The Authority did not take 
into account the fact that the agreement at stake fell below the de minimis thresholds 
established by a notice of the European Commission,117 a soft law instrument. In preliminary 
ruling, the Court held that the national authorities and courts were not bound by the provisions 
of the de minimis notice, and that they had complete discretion to take the thresholds 
mentioned therein into consideration.118 Even though the Court mentioned the well rehearsed 
statement that the Commission cannot depart from its own soft law without giving reasons 
consistent with legitimate expectations, it noted, paradoxically, that the national authorities’ 
disregard of the notice cannot interfere with principles such legitimate expectations and legal 
certainty.119  
Thus, legitimate expectations and legal certainty have a variable content in the multi-layered 
system of EU competition law enforcement. On the one hand, if the case is dealt with by the 
European Commission, individuals are entitled to expect an application of EU soft law, or at 
least, to a statement of reasons as to why such instruments were not applied in their case. On 
the other hand, at the national level, the discretion of NCAs seems to prime over individual 
 
115 Ibid., para. 21. 
116 Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others, Judgment of 13 December 2012, not 
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expectations, and national procedural autonomy is given precedence over fundamental rule of 
law values.  
At a first glance, national procedural autonomy appears hard to reconcile with imperatives 
such as ensuring consistent application of EU law or fostering legitimate expectations and 
legal certainty. But the soft law paradox is not that difficult to solve, as suggested by 
Advocate General Kokott (sadly not followed by the Court in Expedia). She noted that, even 
if not bound by the de minimis notice, national authorities and courts should ‘consider the 
Commission’s assessment’ and also ‘give reasons which can be judicially reviewed for any 
divergences’.120 In this scenario, national authorities can depart from EU soft law in order to 
accommodate national specificities121 or particular economic circumstances that needed to be 
assessed on a case by case basis.122 However, if they decided not to rely on EU soft law, they 
would either need to give reasons for this, or issue their own general soft law laying down 
guidelines on national practice.123  
This solution would enhance legal certainty and help protect legitimate expectations and 
equality within all levels of EU competition law enforcement. Accordingly, EU soft law 
would be applicable by default by the NCAs, and individuals can expect to obtain an 
explanation in case of decisions that depart from notices and guidelines of the Commission. 
Such solution would accommodate diversity within the ECN, as it would allow NCAs to issue 
their own soft law to explain the ways in which they will apply competition rules in case the 
national context requires different interpretation than that provided for in EU instruments. The 
solution suggested by the AG encourages the NCAs to be more transparent about their work 
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and ensure similar level of certainty as that ensured by the European Commission through its 
guidelines and notices.  
5 The Influence of Soft Law and Soft Governance Methods on Courts 
New governance can influence courts as well. The relationship between courts and 
governance was represented by Hervey along a continuum ranging from ‘mutual ignorance; 
through separation, either with hierarchy, or in parallel; to hybrid forms of mutual 
transformation’.124 She argues that ignorance of new forms of governance is the norm from a 
traditional legal perspective. The middle position on the continuum is represented by a 
scenario whereby adjudication and governance have a parallel or a hierarchical relationship. 
Courts can reject the logics of governance if they are considered contrary to the hierarchically 
superior legal requirements. On the other hand, courts can endorse a ‘new governance’ 
position if it is the illustration of principles laid down by traditional law. Finally, the extreme 
position is represented by hybrid forms of mutual transformation, whereby the interpretation 
given by the courts to legal instruments becomes ‘embedded in the context and experience of 
“new governance”, bargaining or informal settlement processes’.125 
This third type of interaction can range from strong forms, whereby mutual transformation 
occurs, with Courts participating actively in new governance processes while at the same time 
integrating the new logics of governance in adjudication. Conversely, a softer version of 
hybridity is represented by the transformation of legal norms or concepts. In this scenario, 
Courts can integrate arguments drawn from governance processes in the analysis of 
proportionality, when assessing justifications to restrictions of free movement in the internal 
market.  
 
124 Hervey, 63 Current Legal Problems (2010), p. 138. 
125 Ibid., p. 144. 
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Hervey finds two types of arguments for such hybrid relationship between adjudication and 
new governance. First, from a traditional legal point of view, soft law produced through new 
governance processes serves the purpose of developing hard law provisions, set out in the EU 
Treaties. In accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, courts are bound to take 
into account subsequent practices in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation. Or, the soft law created through OMC processes voices 
the agreement of the MS on various issues dealt with to a certain extent by the EU Treaties. 
Consequently, courts should pay attention to such soft law instruments. However, under this 
traditional scenario, courts cannot be forced to apply soft law, but only to acknowledge them 
and eventually ‘justify departure from any very settled (accepted and institutionalized) 
position within “new governance” processes’.126 
A second, constructivist perspective, justifies a stronger hybrid relationship between 
adjudication and soft law issued from OMC processes. On the one hand, this perspective 
relies on (contested) advantages of the OMC: its participatory nature, its effectiveness in 
governing multi-level contexts and in fostering learning, etc. Courts should thus take into 
account soft law issued from OMC processes in order to enhance their own legitimacy and 
robustness,127 while engaging with topics and solutions that are the subject of debate across 
jurisdictions. On the other hand, Hervey points out that adjudication should combine with new 
governance for the simple reason that no other valid choice is available. As recent cases such 
as Laval128 or Viking129 demonstrate, the interface between fields of exclusive EU competence 
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(such as the internal market) and fields controlled by the sometimes diverging interests of the 
MS (such as social welfare) creates problems (such as ‘the problem of social Europe’) that 
cannot be solved through the classical decision making processes provided for in the 
Treaties.130 This is because of the particular repartition of competences and constitutional 
arrangement provided for in the Treaties, as well as the different political interests in the 
matter. Striking the balance between the benefits of EU law and market integration and the 
benefits of national welfare can be done through new governance mechanisms, such as the 
OMC, and indeed through adjudication.131 As suggested by Hervey, ‘a mutually 
transformative relationship’ between adjudication and new governance mechanisms is 
desirable, bringing together ‘the best features from each process in a symbiotic interaction’.132 
Hervey conducted her study in the social welfare sector and found evidence for the first and 
the second types of interaction. She did not find many cases to substantiate the third type, 
mainly because of the relative novelty of new governance methods in the particular field of 
research. In fact, also other studies showed a limited impact of the OMC on the case law. In a 
study on the effects of Lisbon strategy on European law, Smismans discovered that while the 
ideational and organizational components of the strategy had an effect on regulatory output, 
they had a very modest effect on case law.133  
Smismans undertook a key word search on Curia to cover Lisbon Council Conclusions, 
Guidelines and Recommendations issued in macro-economic and employment policy 
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133 S. Smismans, ‘From harmonization to co-ordination? EU law in the Lisbon governance architecture’ 18 JEPP 
(2010), p. 504. 
31 
 
coordination.134 His conclusion was threefold. First, the new governance instruments under 
investigation were not referred to in the case law to a significant extent. In his view, this 
occurs because unlike other soft law instruments, the OMC instruments have a solely political 
value and are not necessarily linked to hard law provisions, and they do not interpret 
directives, regulations or the Treaty. Second, the ideational repertoire of Lisbon strategy – 
covering terms such as competitveness and sustainability – appears more and more in the case 
law of the EU Courts, especially after 2000. However, as Smismans himself points out, 
arguing that this proves an engagement with the objectives of OMC processes is purely 
speculative, in the absence of judicial analyses of the instruments themselves. Finally, there is 
no conclusive evidence showing that Courts act as guardians of procedural standards and 
good administration principles in relation to processes like the OMC.135 The research 
conducted by Smismans is undoubtedly sector and key word specific. Nonetheless, given the 
absence of relevant results in the two of the main OMC policy areas, judicial engagement 
with instruments issued in the framework of Lisbon/Europe 2020 processes appears indeed to 
be scarce. 
A more optimistic perspective on the impact of soft law on adjudication is illustrated by 
Korkea-aho, who looked at the implementation of the Water Framework Directive through 
soft mechanisms based on networks and consensual enforcement. Empirical evidence showed 
that soft enforcement mechanisms might streamline legal actions, by offering the information 
and the administrative resources necessary in order to lead effective infringement 
proceedings. Furthermore, managing implementation through networks reduces case load, as 
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problems are solved by participants, without judicial intervention.136As briefly outlined in the 
previous section, competition case law admits legally binding effects of soft law for the 
European Commission on the basis of a mechanism based on general principles of law (such 
as legitimate expectations, legal certainty, transparency).137 Thus, hybrid interactions between 
adjudication and soft law occur in this sector138 as the argumentation of the Court, based on 
legal principles, is inserted in new soft issued at the Commission level139 and then back again 
in new judgments of the EU Courts,140 completing some sort of ‘virtuous circle’.141 The 
Commission and the Court influence each other’s arguments when issuing instruments 
deprived of legally binding force or assessing arguments based thereon in court cases. While 
such approach is welcome, it remains to be seen if it will be exported to other areas of EU 
competence. Competition law is an area of exclusive EU competence, where a multi-level 
governance system of enforcement authorities was put in place during the last decade. Soft 
law was issued in this sector since very early days of European law, and it was mainly 
authored by the European Commission. Competition law presents thus specificities that are 
not necessarily shared by other fields of EU governance, such as those covered by the OMC 
 
136 E. Korkea-aho, ‘Watering Down the Court of Justice? The Dynamics between Network Implementation and 
Article 258 TFEU Litigation’ ELJ (2013). 
137 Ştefan, Soft Law in Court, p. 229 et seq. 
138 Ibid., p. 219-227. 
139 For example: Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23 (2) (a) of Regulation 
No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210/2, para. 3; Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the 
assessment of unlawful State aid [2002] OJ C119/22. 
140 See on the guidelines on fines: Case T-15/02 BASF v. Commission [2006] ECR II-497, para. 250. See on the 
notice on unlawful state aid: Case T-357/02 Freistaat Sachsen and others v. Commission [2007] ECR II-1261, 
para. 118. 
141 A. Stone Sweet, “Judicialization and the Construction of governance” 31 Comparative Political Studies 
(1999), p. 158-159 
33 
 
processes. Furthermore, even in competition law, the CJEU is reluctant to apply the same 
principle-based formula when assessing the effects that EU soft law may produce at the 
national level, thus obstructing some of the functions that such instruments can play in the 
multi-layered system of enforcement of EU competition policy.  
6 Conclusion 
While soft law and new modes of governance such as the OMC became established tools of a 
constitutionally adult MLG system, the CJEU has kept the pace only to a limited extent with 
the changes at the regulatory level. Courts are ready to acknowledge very limited legal effects 
of soft law instruments in some sectors, such as competition, but they do not appear to engage 
with instruments stemming from OMC processes. The grounds and the intensity of effects 
judicially recognized to soft law instruments vary in accordance to the level where they are 
invoked – European or national, and this weakens individual rights. Consequently, the miss-
match between the consequences that soft law can have on the legal situation of individuals 
and the effects given judicial recognition may be detrimental to the functions that such 
instruments are meant to fulfill in a MLG context. Furthermore, this miss-match allows a 
significant amount of soft law to escape the judicial scrutiny of EU Courts, possibly 
enhancing the legitimacy deficit of which such instruments arguably suffer.  
In this context, the Court should be less concerned about establishing clear cut boundaries 
between soft and hard law, and be even more open than before to arguments based on soft law 
instruments and to the ideology put forward by new modes of governance. This would allow 
the EU judicial body to control a larger array of acts, and ensure that the latter do not go 
beyond superior, constitutional principles written down in ‘traditional’ legislation, such as the 
EU Treaties. Courts can address to a certain extent the legitimacy concerns surrounding soft 
law and soft methods of governance, by checking that the procedures ensuring participation 
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and openness of decision making have been respected. While constitutional adulthood of 
MLG is not entirely dependent on adjudication, Courts might help soft law to be more 
effective and to reach its full potential to ‘loosely’ connect the different layers of EU 
governance. 
